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TRANSATLANTIC TWILIGHT? THE IMPACT OF THE MUELLER 




The Mueller investigation into Russian interference in the US 2016 Presidential 
election has dogged the Trump administration, almost from the beginning of its 
time in office. The impact of the probe is widespread and affecting the United 
States in myriad ways both domestically and in foreign policy. We contend that, 
regarding US-European relations, the Mueller investigation is hastening two 
broad trends. Firstly, the continuing revelations are pushing the traditional US 
foreign policy establishment closer towards Europe. Secondly, and 
simultaneously, these revelations, as well as the continued actions of the 
President himself, are acting as a source of tension in US-European relations 
that are pushing European elites into awkward policy choices. The Mueller 
investigation has uncovered an ill-defined Russian strategy of sowing discord 
during the 2016 election cycle, matching other initiatives in Europe itself. In 
the rhetoric of prominent American politicians, it has succeeded. Donald 
Trump has been loath - unlike his verboseness towards the majority of the US's 
traditional allies - to criticise the Russian state. Meanwhile, the US Congress 
has tightened sanctions against Russia. While Trump has distanced himself 
from the European Union on issues such as the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change and the Iranian Nuclear Deal, other parts of the US polity – from city 
to mayors to state governors and Congress itself – have sought to reinforce 
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relationships with European countries. The forthcoming 2018 midterm 
Congressional elections are likely to result in an exacerbation of the process, 
particularly if there are further allegations of Russian cyber-attacks. The 
impact on European leaders is varied. Whereas the German government wants 
to push ahead with a new gas pipeline, which would increase reliance on 
Russian energy supplies, the EU has thus far held firm over sanctions and 
presented a united front denouncing the alleged Russian state-sponsored use of 
a nerve agent in Britain. This paper will aim to explore the impact of the 
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Since his appointment in May 2017 as a Special Prosecutor tasked with 
investigating potential collusion between the Trump Campaign and the Russian 
state, as well as broader potential Russian attempts to disrupt the 2016 US 
presidential election, much has been written about the actions of Robert Mueller. 
The same can also be said, though perhaps to a lesser extent, of investigations 
into these matters by other parts of the US government. Understandably, much of 
what has already been written about the Mueller investigation and the broader 
Trump-Russia issue has focused on domestic US politics, with the effect on the 
operations of the White House and the impact the investigations may have on the 
2018 midterm elections being particularly prominent themes. Writing prior to 
Mueller's appointment, for instance, Allan Lichtman argued that, should the most 
lurid allegations against Trump and his campaign prove correct the US Congress 
would have a “near-airtight Case” for impeaching him for “treason”3, with John 
Burke stating that “at the very least”, contacts between the Trump campaign and 
administration and Russia were “inappropriate”4. In the media, The Guardian’s 
Luke Harding has documented the attempts of the Trump Campaign to “discredit” 
Mueller5, whereas George W. Bush's former speechwriter and a senior editor of 
The Atlantic David Frum has claimed that the Trump Administration represents a 
“crisis” for the “work in progress” that is US “[d]emocracy”6. Whilst former 
Democrat staffer and contributor to The Hill, Brent Budowsky, positing that the 
continuous run of “bombshells” emanating from the investigations will have a 
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negative effect on the Republicans in the 2018 midterms7. Finally, participants 
involved in the events have also had their say, with James Comey, the former 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whose firing led to 
Mueller’s appointment, hypothesizing that Mueller is likely to consider whether 
or not his firing was an attempt to “obstruct Justice”8, whereas Hillary Clinton, 
Trump's opponent in the 2016 election, has labelled Russian actions during the 
2016 US election “unprecedented”9. Yet, what has been missing from the ink 
spilled so far has been a sustained consideration of the ways the Mueller 
investigation, and the broader Trump whirlwind, has impacted and may continue 
to impact, Europe. 
In short, we contend that, regarding US-European relations, the Mueller 
investigation, and the broader dynamic set of investigations, lawsuits and 
journalistic inquiries that it arguably spearheads, is hastening two broad trends. 
Firstly, the continuing revelations are pushing the traditional US foreign policy 
establishment closer towards Europe. Secondly, and simultaneously, these 
revelations, as well as the continued actions of the President himself, are acting 
as a source of tension in US-European relations that are pushing European 
elites into awkward policy choices. To explore and illustrate these contentions, 
this article evolves into two sections. To begin with, the current landscape of 
the US government investigations into the 2016 US elections, the Trump 
campaign and administration, and Russia is mapped. This occurs to enable 
readers to ground themselves within a complex and ever-shifting set of 
interconnected investigations. Next, this piece surveys some of the current and 
potential future effects for Europe of these investigations and the broader 
actions of Trump and his administration. Effects explored include the challenge 
that Trump poses to that rule-based order seen as sacrosanct by many US and 
European elites that, in theory at least, underpins US-European relations, 
sustained attempts to work around Trump and the inspiration that deliberately 
divisive European populists may find in the words and actions of Trump and 
the emulation this inspiration is likely to engender. All told, the Trump 
administration's approach is threatening the transatlantic order that has 
prevailed since the end of the Cold War. 
 
The Current State of US Government Investigations into the 2016 Election 
 
As of the end of May 2018, the four most high-profile US government 
investigations into attempts by the Russian state and related actors to influence 
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Explode, <http://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/385861-gop-faces-midterm-disaster-as-
mueller-rosenstein-cohen-bombshells-explode> (28.05.2018). 
8 J. Comey, A Higher Loyalty: Truth, Lies and Leadership, Kindle Edition, London 2018, 
Loc. 4093. 
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the elections of 2016, as well as collusion by members of the Trump campaign, 
have been an FBI investigation that was cut short when Trump dismissed 
Comey in May 2017, an investigation by the House of Representatives 
Intelligence Committee that ended in March 2018, an ongoing investigation by 
the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Mueller investigation. 
The FBI probe has its roots in the hacking of emails from the Democratic 
National Committee. This hack was confirmed on July 25th, 2016 and led to an 
investigation that began exploring potential links between the Trump campaign 
and the Russian state10. A formal investigation was likely triggered by 
information pertaining to Trump campaign advisor George Papadopoulos11, 
who told Trump in March 2016 that “he had connections” that could “help 
arrange a meeting between [...] Trump and President Putin”12. On March 20th, 
2017, then FBI Director Comey confirmed that the FBI was “investigating the 
nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign 
and the Russian government” as well as whether coordination between them 
occurred13. The FBI investigation ended when Trump dismissed Comey on 
May 9th, 201714. 
 The next investigation to be terminated was run by the House of 
Representatives Intelligence Committee. From January 2017, the committee's 
work coalesced around four main themes; Russian “cyber activity and other 
active measures”, whether such “active measures included links between Russia” 
and US individuals and “associated political campaigns”, the US response to 
such active measures and what future responses should be and, finally, whether 
“leaks of classified information took place related to [a January 6th, 2016] 
Intelligence Community Assessment of these matters”15. This assessment found 
with “high confidence” that Russian President Vladimir Putin had ordered an 
“influence campaign” to “undermine public faith in the US democratic process” 
and that “Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for 
President-elect Trump”16. The house investigation was ended in March 2018 by 
the committee’s Republican majority. Key outcomes included a finding that 
                                               
10 D. Volz , Democratic Party Email Leak Points to Russia: Cyber Experts, U.S. Officials, 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-russia-fbi-idUSKCN1051TD> (25.05.2018). 
11 House Intelligence Committee Majority, January 20th, 2018 Memo to House Intelligence 
Committee Minority: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Abuses at the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
12 R. Muel ler , October 5th, 2017 Statement of Offense of George Papadopoulos, pp. 4-5. 
13 House Intelligence Committee, Testimony, and Questioning of James Comey March 
20th, 2017. 
14 D. Trump, May 9th, 2017 Letter Dismissing Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation James Comey.  
15 House Intelligence Committee, Russia Investigation Parameters Announced in March 
2017. 
16
 US Intelligence Community, January 6th, 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment 
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Russia had attempted to influence elections in Europe and the US, but that 
collusion between the Trump Campaign and the Russian state did not occur17. 
Recommendations included the development of better bulwarks in the US and 
Europe against potential Russian electoral interference and a call for the 
European States to lessen economic dependence on Russia18. The closing of the 
investigation was criticised by the committee’s Democrat minority, who 
unsuccessfully tried to extend it by proposing motions that, amongst other 
things, called for subpoenas to be issued to, among others, Trump's son and 
son-in-law, Attorney General Jeff Sessions and the Trump Campaign 
organisation19. 
The Senate Intelligence Committee investigation also started in January 
2017, meanwhile, is ongoing20. It was launched with the aim of reviewing “the 
intelligence that informed” the January 6th, 2017 US Intelligence Community 
assessment of Russian activities related to US elections, as well as broader 
concerns of the Intelligence Community “related to Russia and the 2016' 
election21. A month after he was dismissed, Comey claimed before the 
committee that Trump had told him in January 2017 that ‘I need loyalty, I 
expect loyalty” and that in February 2017, referring to the FBI’s investigation 
of Trump’s former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, Trump urged 
Comey to “let this go” because Flynn “is a good guy”. Comey also stated that 
in March 2017 Trump had denied any links with Russia and asked Comey to 
publicly confirm that the FBI was not investigating Trump personally22. Thus 
far, this investigation has avoided the partisan disagreements of its House 
equivalent. 
The fourth, and potentially most consequential, investigation began on 
May 17th, 2017 when Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed 
Mueller, a former FBI Director, as a Special Prosecutor23. Mueller was directed 
                                               
17 House Intelligence Committee Majority, March 22nd, 2018 Report on Russian Active 
Measures Findings and Recommendations, pp. 1, 3-4. 
18
 Ibidem, p. 5. 
19 A. Sch iff, March 22nd, 2018 Schiff Statement After Committee Republicans Voted to 
Release Partisan Report. 
20 Senate Intelligence Committee, January 13th, 2017 Joint Statement on Committee 
Inquiry into Russian Intelligence Activities. 
21 Senate Intelligence Committee, March 30th, 2017 Hearing Entitled ‘Disinformation: A 
Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns. 
22 J. Comey, June 8th, 2017 Statement for the Record Delivered to the Senate Intelligence 
Committee. 
23 J. Ainsley, Former FBI Chief Mueller Appointed to Probe Trump-Russia Ties, 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump/former-fbi-chief-mueller-appointed-to-prob-
e-trump-russia-ties-idUSKCN18D1XT> (17.05.2018). 
Rosenstein had the authority to appoint Mueller because Sessions had previously refused 
himself from considering matters pertaining to Russia because he failed to disclose contacts 
with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak while acting on behalf of the Trump campaign. 
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to “ensure a full and thorough investigation of the Russian government’s efforts 
to interfere in the 2016 presidential election”, was “authorized to conduct” the 
investigation Comey had confirmed in March 2017 and given latitude “to 
prosecute federal crimes arising from the investigation of these matters”24. Thus 
far, Mueller’s investigation appears to have coalesced around three 
interconnected strands:  
1. The extent and significance of contacts, and potential coordination, 
between members of the Trump campaign and administration and 
representatives of, or at least those claiming or thought to be 
representatives of, the Russian state; 
2. The evasion of tax and the failure to register work for foreign 
governments and political parties, mainly in Ukraine, by those linked to 
the Trump Campaign; 
3. Attempts by individuals and organisations with links to the Russian 
state to disrupt the US elections of 2016. 
Thus far, the first strand has seen Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor to 
the Trump campaign, plead guilty to lying to the FBI in January 2017 regarding 
contact with a Russian academic thought to have connections to “Russian 
government officials” believed to have “dirt” on Clinton25. Similarly, Flynn 
pled guilty to lying to the FBI in January 2017 about his discussions with 
Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak whilst Trump was President-Elect26.  
On the second strand, in October 2017 Mueller claimed in an indictment 
that Paul Manafort, one of Trump's campaign managers, and Richard Gates, a 
campaign aid, had acted as “unregistered agents of the government of Ukraine” 
and two Ukrainian political parties, had raised millions of dollars for Ukrainian 
entities, had laundered these funds through “scores” of “corporations, 
partnerships and bank accounts” and drew on them personally without paying 
tax required in the US27. In February 2018, Gates pled guilty to aiding Manafort 
in tax evasion, misleading accountants and deliberately misclassifying 
payments as loans28. Manafort, meanwhile, is due to stand trial on charges 
related to “bank fraud, tax evasion” and foreign bank accounts in Virginia in 
July 2018 and for “making false statements about his foreign lobbying work” 
and “engaging in a money laundering conspiracy” in a federal trial in 
                                                                                                                       
L. Gambino, S. Ackerman , Jeff Sessions Recuses Himself from Russia Inquiry Amid 
Calls for Resignation, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/02/jeff-sessions-
calls-for-resignation-claims-lies-russia> (17.05.2018). 
24 R. Rosenstein , May 17th, 2017 Order Appointing Robert Mueller as Special 
Prosecutor. 
25 R. Muel ler , October 5th, 2017 Statement, pp. 2, 6-7.  
26 Idem,  November 30th, 2017 Statement of Offense of Michael Flynn. 
27
 Idem, October 27th, 2017 Indictment of Paul Manafort and Richard Gates, pp. 1-3. 
28 Idem,  February 23rd, 2018 Statement of Offense of Richard Gates, pp. 1-3. 
P a g e  | 17 
 
 
September 2018 in Washington D.C.29 On a related note, on February 14th, 
2018, Alex van der Zwaan, a Dutch attorney, pled guilty to lying to Mueller 
about his contacts with Richard Gates and about his role in the dissemination of 
a report about a Ukrainian trial of Yulia Tymoshenko, a Ukrainian politician 
“generally regarded as pro-western”30.  
On the final strand, on February 12th, Richard Pinedo pled guilty to 
running a company that “offered [...] services designed to circumvent” the 
security of “online digital payment companies” that were allegedly exploited by 
Russian individuals and companies attempting to disrupt the 2016 US 
election31. Four days later, Mueller filed an indictment against 13 Russian 
individuals who worked for a company named Internet Research Agency LLC. 
According to the indictment, these individuals engaged in a conspiracy with the 
aim of interfering with US “political and electoral processes”32. 
Beyond these four investigations, there are also a broader set of 
investigations, legal cases, and sanctions that often overlap in focus. The Senate 
Judiciary Committee has, for example, pursued evidence related to a meeting 
involving Trump's son and son-in-law, Manafort and three Russians, including 
a lawyer named Natalia Veselnitskaya who was thought to have material 
damaging to Clinton, with particular zeal33. Whilst the Democratic Party lodged 
a lawsuit in April 2018 based on the claim that the Trump Campaign was “a 
willing and active partner” of the Russian state during the 2016 US election34. 
                                               
29 J. Gerstein , Federal Judge Rejects Manafort's Bid to Dismiss Mueller Indictment, 
<https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/15/manafort-mueller-indictment-590215> 
(25.05.2018); Idem, Manafort Virginia Trial Delayed Two Weeks, <https://www.politi-
co.com/story/2018/05/25/paul-manafort-trial-schedule-609041> (29.05.2018); C. Kel l y, 
K. Polantz, Manafort Trial Set to Begin July 10, 
<https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/08/politics/manafort-trial/index.html> (25.05.2018). 
30 M. Crowley, D. Stern, K. Vogel , Trump tells Ukrainian Politician he Won’t lift 
Russia Sanctions, <https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-tells-ukraine-politician-he-wont-
lift-russia-sanctions/> (20.05.2018); R. Muel ler , February 14th, 2018 Statement of 
Offense of Alex van der Zwaan. 
Interestingly, Taras Kuzio has argued that the image of Tymoshenko as inherently pro-
western in her outlook and actions is overplayed, highlighting a persistent failure to stick to 
verifiable facts and her fostering of animosity towards foreign investment in the Ukrainian 
economy, regardless of its origin, as evidence. See for instance: 
T. Kuzio, Yulia Tymoshenko’s Policies Sit Uneasily with Her Image as a Pro-European 
Politician, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/05/04/yulia-tymoshenkos-policies-sit-
uneasily-with-her-image-as-a-pro-european-politician/> (30.05.2018). 
31 R. Muel ler , February 2nd, 2018 Statement of Offense of Richard Pinedo. 
32 Idem, February 16th, 2018 Indictment of Internet Research Agency LLC and Named 
Individuals. 
33 Senate Judiciary Committee, Materials from Inquiry into Circumstances Surrounding 
Trump Tower Meeting, <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/releases/materials-from-
inquiry-into-circumstances-surrounding-trump-tower-meeting> (12.05.2018). 
34
 Democratic Party, April 20th, 2018 Complaint Filed Against the Russian State, Donald 
Trump and Others, p. 5. 
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On a related note, there is a raft of US sanctions against Russia, some of which 
are coordinated with the European Union (EU) and others, that relate to events 
in Ukraine from 2014 onward and the 2016 US election. The most recent raft of 
US sanctions was imposed in April 2018, whereas a new round of related 
sanctions have also arisen from the poisoning of Sergey and Yulia Skripal in 
Salisbury, England, in March 2018, which the British government blames on 
Russia35. With the breadth, depth and dynamic nature of these investigations, 
legal cases and sanctions in mind, we will now consider how they, as well as 
actions of the wider Trump administration, might impact Europe.  
 
Effects on Europe  
 
The Mueller investigation has been widely reported in Europe, acting as a 
proxy for the conflict between the US establishment – one that supports a 
multilateral rules-based order anchored in a strong transatlantic relationship – 
and the forces of populism encapsulated by Donald Trump, disinterested or 
even openly hostile to these principles36. In essence, the Mueller investigation 
exacerbates a dynamic between the United States and Europe, that is to say 
since Trump became President, European leaders have sought to stay as close 
as possible to the US state broadly defined, whilst simultaneously widening 
their policy options. The Mueller probe has uncovered the behaviour of a 
number of individuals, now or at one time close to the levers of power in the 
Trump White House, who have shown a disregard for the long-standing 
transatlantic relationship. Similarly, Donald Trump himself has disdained most 
of his predecessor’s foreign policy, including elements forged through 
negotiation with the EU. Trump, representing as he does the encapsulation of a 
particular form of populism, threatens the institutional and normative 
foundations that European leaders have long taken for granted. 
European elites, for the most part, have looked on in horror as Trump has 
torn up the agreements painstakingly crafted by his predecessor, President 
Barack Obama. These most notably include the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change and the Iranian nuclear deal. Nevertheless, EU leaders have responded 
to Trump - and the sentiments of their own citizens to him - in differing ways. 
President Emmanuel Macron has most clearly sought to engage with Trump. 
The French leader’s visit to Washington in April 2018, in an attempt to prevent 
the President torpedoing the Iranian agreement, involved the bizarre spectacle 
of the pair apparently on good terms, while Macron advocated an anti-
                                               
35 B. Smith, April 2018 House of Commons Library Briefing Paper: Sanctions against 
Russia-In Brief.; US Treasury Department, OFAC FAQs: Other Sanctions Programs: 
Ukraine-/Russia-related Sanctions, <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/San-
ctions/Pages/faq_other.aspx#567> (30.05.2018). 
36 B. Bruno, Trump is Wrong over Iran, but Europe Can’t Afford to Divorce the US, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/16/europe-cant-afford-full-divor-
ce-iran-nuclear-deal-trump-europe-antagonism> (20.05.2018). 
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Trumpian liberal world order in Congress37. With Trump, for his part, 
seemingly completely disregarding his fellow President’s council38. Macron, 
although careful not to directly criticise the President, seamlessly ploughed on 
with his vision of globalization that, accurately or not, promises to benefit all 
within a “fair system”39.  
Theresa May has pursued a similar, if less successful, strategy. An early 
visit to the White House in 2017, including the offer of a state visit to Britain, 
met with hostility from the British public40. Embroiled by the Brexit process 
and weakened by the 2017 General Election result, and despite the fact that 
Trump currently plans to visit the UK in July 2018, May has since kept her 
distance from Trump, with public animous, likely feeding into UK policy. 
Something demonstrated by the fact that Trump will come only for a one day 
“working visit” rather than the full-state visit originally offered and the mass-
protests planned to coincide with his presence41. On a broader European level, 
the EU was initially, through the likes of President of the European Council 
Donald Tusk, relatively emollient towards Trump. This has gradually hardened, 
however42. Recently, for example, Tusk labelled the Trump administration 
“capricious”, thus deliberately shining a light on its inconsistencies43. 
Berlin has, perhaps, demonstrated the most restrained attitude towards the 
Trump administration out of the large EU states. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 
meetings with the President have been cautious and she has issued carefully 
calibrated statements on EU-American policy. Perhaps most visibly, Merkel 
said in a 2017 speech that Germany could no longer “completely rely” on its 
                                               
37 E. Macron , April 26th, 2018 Speech to US Congress. 
38 M. Landler , Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned, 
<https://www.npr.org/2017/10/13/557622096/transcript-trump-s-remarks-on-iran-nuclear-
deal> (28.05.2018). 
39 World Economic Forum, President Macron Unveils Bold, Inclusive Agenda for 
Globalization, <https://www.weforum.org/press/2018/01/president-macron-unveils-bold-
inclusive-agenda-for-globalization/> (28.05.2018). 
40 L. Hughes, G. Parker , E. White, Labour scared Trump into scrapping UK visit, says 
Johnson, <https://www.ft.com/content/e9769786-f78c-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00> (20.05.2018). 
41 J. Elgot , Donald Trump to Meet Queen on UK Visit in July, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/apr/26/donald-trump-to-visit-uk-on-friday-
13-july> (28.05.2018); J. Watts , Donald Trump UK Visit Set for July as Mass Protests 
Planned, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/donald-trump-uk-visit-date-us-
july-protests-a8322596.html> (28.05.2018). 
42 M. Birnbaum, G. Witte, As Tensions with Trump Deepen, Europe Wonders if America 
is Lost for Good, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/as-tensions-with-trump-
deepen-europe-wonders-if-america-is-lost-for-good/2018/05/18/6f90c56e-587f-11e8-9889-
07bcc1327f4b_story.html?utm_term=.716a394bfa97> (21.05.2018). 
43 D. Boffey, “Capricious”: Donald Tusk Condemns Trump Administration, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/16/donald-tusk-condemns-donald-trump-
transatlantic-trade-war> (21.05.2018). 
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allies Britain and the United States44. A sentiment subsequently repeated by the 
Chancellor45. Germany, seemingly desperate to uphold both its vital interests 
and the rule-based system that has helped it prosper economically, has seen its 
most important relationships sour, with Russia over Crimea and Donbas, with 
Turkey over President Erdogan’s growing authoritarianism, with Britain over 
its exit from the EU and now with the United States46. The 2018 German 
government’s coalition agreement revealed the grains of a new transatlantic 
strategy47. Without mentioning Trump, or the executive, the agreement outlined 
an approach of increased engagement with other centres of American power – 
at state level, with the security services and the Congress – and put Canada on a 
par with the US48. As the Mueller investigation reveals how Trump and his 
inner circle hold the current international order in contempt, Germany has 
apparently sought to maintain a transatlantic relationship by, at least partially, 
circumventing the White House. The agreement also put forward a view on US 
trade policy: “protectionism is not the right way”49. 
Although the German government has led the sanctions policy against 
Russia, it also has vital interests at play with its giant neighbour. A proposed 
gas pipeline, Nord Stream 2, has been one area where Germany has continued 
to work with Russia50. Moreover, after President Trump announced he was 
pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, Angela Merkel, as well as her 
Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, was quick to travel to Moscow to consult 
Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister51. As such, the 
                                               
44 J. Hen ley, Angela Merkel: EU Cannot Completely Rely on US and Britain Any More, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/28/merkel-says-eu-cannot-completely-re-
ly-on-us-and-britain-any-more-g7-talks> (23.05.2018). 
45 A. Delfs, G. Viscusi , Merkel Says Europe Can't Count on U.S. Military Umbrella 
Anymore, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-10/merkel-says-europe-can-
t-count-on-u-s-military-umbrella-anymore> (23.05.2018). 
46 Deutsche Welle, Germany and Turkey in 2017: A Rollercoaster Relationship, 
<http://www.dw.com/en/germany-and-turkey-in-2017-a-rollercoaster-relationship/a-41897041> 
(24.05.2018); C. Schreck, Tensions Between Russia And West Simmer In Munich, 
<https://www.rferl.org/a/gabriel-ukraine-peacekeepers-could-lead-easing-russia-
sanctions/29045157.html> (24.05.2018) 
47 CDU, CSU und SPD, Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für 
Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, 
CSU und SPD. [CDU, CSU and SPD, A new start for Europe. A new dynamic for Germany. 
A new solidarity for our country: Coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and SPD], 
p. 147. 
48 A. Ret tman, The EU and US in the age of Trump, <https://euobserver.com/europe-in-
review/139870> (26.05.2018). 
49 CDU, CSU und SPD, Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa…, p. 147. 
50 A. Ret tman , Germany starts to build Nord Stream 2, <https://euobserver.com 
/foreign/141756> (25.05.2018). 
51 Deutsche Welle, Germany's Angela Merkel meets Russia's Vladimir Putin, 
<http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-angela-merkel-meets-russias-vladimir-putin/a-43838039> 
(25.05.2018). 
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instability encapsulated by the withdrawal from the Iran deal, something 
reflected in the on-off summit between Trump and North Korean leader Kim 
Jong Un, as well as the details revealed by the Mueller investigation may have 
had the perverse result of pushing some EU countries closer to Russia in a 
search for stability52. Seemingly, events in the United States are leading EU 
leaders to seek “like-minded coalitions” on the range of issues on which Trump 
has declined responsibility or is seeking to challenge existing norms53. 
Ultimately though, perhaps the most acute problem that Trump – and the 
Mueller investigation – poses for European countries is the rise of racially 
tinged populism54. After much apparent relief when Macron was elected in May 
2017, populists have taken power in Austria, have consolidated control in 
Hungary and, if they are able to overcome the structural pro-EU bias in the 
country, will also do so in Italy55. Together, these populists explicitly seek to 
undermine key rules, at least in theory based on liberal political ideals, 
generally seen as sancrasaunt by elites on both sides of the Atlantic. In short, 
one of the greatest challenges to the EU emanating from the US is one of 
emulation, with praise between Trump and European far-right leaders flowing 
both ways56. Meanwhile, the EU’s response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
and the destabilising of Eastern Ukraine presents a key dividing line between 
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many European establishment and populist parties57. Along similar lines, and 
circling back to where we began, one of the key outcomes of the Mueller 
investigation thus far appears to be that Manafort and Gates, at one point key 
members of the Trump campaign, had previously played a part in promoting 
Ukrainian political parties that deliberately exploited the east-west split in the 
Ukrainian body-politic for short-term electoral gain (a classic populist strategy 
reflected in the divisive narrative of Trump), while conveniently enriching 




The EU and the broader European elite is clearly seeking to wait out the 
Trump Presidency in the hope that no serious damage is inflicted in the 
intervening four, or even eight, years. Some analysts believe the implications, 
however, could be permanent as the old system frays and the US re-orientate its 
foreign policy59. Likewise, Europeans are hardening their attitudes towards the 
United States. A recent opinion poll showed how German's attitudes on security 
had shifted from transatlanticism; they now overwhelmingly see their most 
important security partners as European, and on a wider range of issues 
specifically France60. This fits a historical pattern when less amenable 
Presidents occupy the White House. European integration, for instance, 
accelerated in the 1970s when Richard Nixon was in office, and in particular 
after he closed the so-called “gold window”, jeopardising European monetary 
stability61. 
As we have seen, Mueller, along with the broader investigative milieu he 
unofficially heads, has illustrated that those working for Trump have attempted 
to exploit connections they had with those believed to be close to the Russian 
state in order to aide his election and have lied to the FBI about their contacts 
                                               
57 L. Pasha-Robinson , Marine Le Pen Backs Vladimir Putin and Denies Invasion of 
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For an interesting counterpoint to this, see the writing of Jake Sullivan, a Senior Fellow at 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former Director of Policy Planning 
the the US State Department, who posits that the current international system is resilient 
enough to ‘endure' the attempts of Trump, among others, to undermine it. Although, 
Sullivan does caveat this line of thought by arguing that, while a single Trump term is 
manageable, a second could be ‘cataclysmic'. 
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with Russian officials. Whereas it appears Trump himself has not been averse 
to attempting to interfere with investigations into these matters. Yet, as well as 
being felt domestically, the effects of these investigations, along with the 
broader actions of Trump and his administration, are being felt in Europe as 
well. With the EU, its constituent parts and the leaders of individual states 
attempting, with differing degrees of success, to chart a course through a world 
disrupted. In the medium term, much hangs on the results of the 2018 midterms 
with, one presumes, many European elites hoping for a democratic surge that, 
at the least, could blunt the instincts of the current White House occupant. 
Further in the future, whoever the next US president may be, Republican or 
Democrat, will be faced with a transatlantic alliance frayed by a deliberately 
provocative president and the shifting of other geopolitical fault-lines that, as of 
Trump's election, can be said to have entered a new, particularly trying and 
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